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Abstract:  
The gap between the willingness to accept and willingness to pay is the outcome of incomplete 
valuation. The problem therefore is more about completing the valuation procedure. The first part 
of the solution involves two items: one is the inclusion of the direct and indirect income effects 
and the other is the inclusion of the substitution effect between the numeraire good (i.e., income) 
and the good under consideration. The second part of the solution concerns the respective hedonic 
content of income, the good, and the setting. These two explanations point to a third solution that 
puts the setting together with the income and substitution effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the sticking points in economics is that the theoretical equality of the willingness to accept 
(WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) is not often validated by empirical work. In fact, the WTA-
WTP gap can turn out to be a substantial amount. Henderson (1941) was the first to raise the 
problem in a commentary to Hicks (1939). Later, Krutilla (1967) pointed out the same issue in the 
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context of environmental goods. Gregory and Brown (1999) and Harowitz and McConnell (2002) 
are the more recent surveys on the topic. 
 
This paper argues that the equality of the WTA and WTP is possible if the corresponding marginal 
utility of income, UY, is the same across alternative states (Hicks 1939; Hicks 1941). If so, the 
gains and losses of equal amounts of money necessarily indicate the same effects and it implies 
that the utility function assumes a symmetric sigmoid form.1 Results of Willig (1967) for the 
private goods and those of Mäler (1974) and Randall and Stoll (1980) for the public goods are 
therefore easy to comprehend. Otherwise, the income effects need to be fully accounted for in the 
valuation procedure. Along with the income effects, the substitutability of the good under 
consideration with its numeraire good (i.e., income) also needs to be included in the valuation 
procedure (Randall and Stoll 1980; Hanemann 1991). 
 
This paper furthermore argues that the equality of the WTA and WTP is possible if there is no 
hedonic value to consider. Fundamentally, the hedonic explanation to the WTA-WTP gap is less 
about being familiar with transactions (List 2003), utilizing incentive-compatible mechanisms in 
the valuation procedure (Coursey et al. 1987; Plott and Zeiler 2005), or even incorporating the 
income and substitution effects pointed out earlier. Rather, the issue is more about the psychology 
with regard to income, the good, and/or the setting.2 Income does not affect the valuation of the 
                                                 
1 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1980), in contrast, assume an asymmetric sigmoid form. They 
examine psychological utility on the scenario where a good is given or taken away from the person (and 
not really the economic utility on the good itself) and their findings indicate that UY is not constant across 
states. To verify, hold psychological utility constant across states then check out the slopes. Notice that UY 
for a gain of money (i.e., WTA) is less than UY for a loss of an equal amount of money (i.e., WTP) 
corresponding to their respective scenario. The WTA-WTP gap occurs even if the procedure for response 
elicitation is controlled in the setup. 
2 An “endowment effect” is the effect associated with ownership, possession, entitlement, or claim, whereas 
a “reference effect” is contingent to, say, an endowment. “Setting” is the (specific nature of) endowment. 
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good if money does not assume the role of status symbol or basis for social comparisons (Frank 
1985). Similarly, a good that is intended for exchange and not for use or enjoyment does not 
affect the outcome of the valuation (Kahneman et al. 1990). Otherwise, emotions (Damasio 1994; 
Loewenstein 1996; Peters et al. 2003) and moral considerations such as existence or intrinsic 
value (Boyce et al. 1992; Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) would be misrepresented as the valuation 
of the good. The outcome and process to reach the outcome also do not matter in the valuation of 
the good if the setting is not relevant (Loewenstein and Prelect 1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 
1996; Köszegi and Rabin 2006). Otherwise, the setting wherein a good is received in an ex ante 
condition of, say, no possession or given up in an ex ante condition of possession is a relevant 
dimension in the valuation regardless if money involved or not (Kahneman et al. 1990; Kahneman 
et al. 1991; Knetsch 1995; Knetsch and Wong 2009). The same applies if the situation is risky 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) or riskless (Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In fact, 
differences in the valuations remain even if bi-directional compensations between losers and 
gainers of the transaction are allowed. 
 
Discarding the empirical issues involved in carrying out the valuation of the good, the puzzle of 
the WTA-WTP gap is simply about incomplete valuation.3 Completing the valuation is therefore 
the solution to the problem. One part of the solution is the “economics of valuation,” which 
concerns the income and substitution effects, and the other is called the “psychology of 
valuation,” which deals with the respective hedonic contents of income, the good, and the setting. 
 
Lastly, the paper submits the subjective well-being (SWB) valuation procedure as a third solution 
                                                                                                                                                 
Studies on endowment actually draw attention to the perception of the setting in explaining the WTA-WTP 
gap and not on income and/or the good per se. 
3 WTP became the choice of valuation over WTA on the presumption that WTA is flawed. Knetsch (1990) 
and Gregory and Brown (1999) note that using WTP when WTA is appropriate implies two things: first, 
the good is undervalued; and, second, allocative efficiency is effectively abandoned.  
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to the problem. The SWB procedure is anchored on both income and substitution effects, but it 
has two formulations. The “exclusive” form discards all hedonic content of income, the good, and 
the setting. In contrast, the “inclusive” form maintains that the setting is relevant in the valuation 
procedure. Di Tella et al. (2001), Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2002), and Welsch (2002) 
were the first to use (a version of) the exclusive form procedure. Welsch and Kühling (2009) and 
Frey et al. (2010) are recent surveys on the topic. 
 
Part 2 presents the economics and psychology solutions to the puzzle of the WTA-WTP gap. The 
demonstration is done at the conceptual level in order to point out the possibility of the 
incomplete valuation. Part 3 presents an alternative solution. Again, the demonstration is done at 
the conceptual level to draw attention to its parallels between the economics and psychology 
solutions as well as to bring out the strength of the alternative. What is asserted in the end is that 
an integrated approach might be more helpful in solving the incomplete valuation problem and in 
advancing the valuation procedure. The last part concludes. 
 
2. FIGURING OUT THE WTA-WTP GAP 
 
2.1. Incomplete Economics 
 
Consider a standard utility function like U = U(Y, Z), where Y is income and Z is the good. Y and 
Z are exogenous and assumed to carry no hedonic content. By convention, Y is the numeraire 
good, or the accepted unit upon which the valuation of the good is anchored. Other attributes are 
excluded in the discussion in order to simplify the exposition. The usual assumptions about the 
utility function apply. Of course, the foremost assertion here is that choice-actions as manifested 
in buying and selling reflect true utility. Such assertion takes the market or pseudo-market as the 
principal site for a transaction. This textbook setup leads to the valuation of Z as:  
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Y
Z
U
U
YU
ZU
=
∂∂
∂∂
        (1a) 
Holding the utility constant at the ex ante state with increasing Z or holding the utility constant in 
the ex post state without increasing Z obtains the same valuation of Z in terms of Y. Such result is 
reached because UY (i.e., direct income effect) is unchanged across the alternative states. It is then 
easy to define the valuation of Z in terms of the alternative states, as follows: 
WTPWTA Y
Z
Y
Z
U
U
U
U
=         (1b) 
where
WTAY
U is the marginal utility of income if money is received in the ex post state and 
PWTY
U is 
the marginal utility of income if money is paid in the ex ante state. If so, it does not matter if one 
ends up as the winner or loser as long as there is indifference to the outcome. 
 
Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the valuations of Z are not going to be identical if UY across 
the alternative states is not the same precisely because it matters if the money is collected or 
given up. What occurs instead of Equation 1b is: 
WTPWTA Y
Z
Y
Z
Y
Z
U
U
U
U
U
U
>>        (2) 
The change in UY in this case is a crucial explanation why WTA turns out to be larger than WTP. 
Larger amounts of money are necessary to reach the utility in the ex post state since the increases 
in Y lower 
WTAY
U in the process. In contrast, smaller amounts of money are required to maintain 
the utility in the ex ante state since the decreases in Y increase 
PWTY
U in the process. There must be 
some unaccounted income effect brought about by the changes in income. This conclusion is the 
same for both price-constrained and quantity-constrained valuations. The required correction is 
obvious. 
 
The claim is that the utility function takes the form U = F[Y, Z(Y)] if the indirect income effect is 
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internalized in the valuation procedure. The expressions and assumptions are as defined earlier. In 
this case, however, Z is necessarily not anymore exogenous to Y, and its valuation is: 
dY
dZ
FF
F
YU
ZU
ZY
Z
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
       (3a) 
Suppose FY > 0. If )0( >WTAYF ↓ with the receipt of money, then )( dY
dZ
FZ > 0; and if )0( >WTPYF ↑ 
with the payment of money, then )(
dY
dZ
FZ < 0. Suppose dY
dZ > 0. If so, the indirect income effect 
depends on FZ, which is positive if Z is a good and negative when Z is a bad. By logical necessity, 
the accounting of the income effects works out Equation 2, thus
dY
dZ
FF
F
dY
dZ
FF
F
ZY
Z
ZY
Z
WTPWTA
+
=
+
. The 
outcome is still the same if
dY
dZ < 0. In fact, Equation 3a is similar to the results in Dolan et al. 
(2010). 
 
Yet, the utility function takes the form U = F[Y(Z), Z(Y)] in case the assumption of exogenous Y 
is relaxed (c.f., Cropper and Oates 1992), and Z is deemed divisible. In this case, the expression 
asserts that changes in the quantity and/or quality of Z can bring changes to Y, which needs to be 
included in the valuation. The substitution between Y and Z is reflected as follows:4 
dY
dZ
FF
dZ
dY
FF
YU
ZU
ZY
YZ
+
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
       (3b) 
Now, →
dZ
dY ∞ if there is limited or no substitution and the required money to hold utility constant 
is large, FY → 0, and →
dZ
dY
FY 0. In this case, the valuation of Z reaches infinity. Second, →dZ
dY 0 
if there is substitution and the required money to hold utility constant turns small, FY → ∞, and 
                                                 
4 The effect of Z or that of both Y and Z on another external variable like health can be examined as well. In 
such case, the utility function takes the form, respectively, U = F[[Y(Z), Z(Y)] + W(Z)] or U = F[[Y(Z), 
Z(Y)] + W(Y, Z)], where W is the “health” function. 
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→
dZ
dY
FY 0. In this case, the valuation of Z approximates zero. Note that these results are similar 
with those of Randall and Stoll (1980) and Hanemann (1990). The analysis is also consistent with 
that of Amiran and Hagen (2003) who use an asymptotic bounded utility function. What is more 
important is the finding that these equations specify
dY
dZ
FZ to be the missing element that explains 
the WTA-WTP gap.  
 
The direct and indirect income effects are accounted in Equation 3a then the substitution effect is 
accounted in Equation 3b. These results spell out that the central elements in a valuation 
procedure in economics are the direct and indirect income effects.  
 
2.2 Missing Psychology 
 
The psychology of valuation looks at three things. First, considers Y in the utility function U = 
U(Y, Z) as defined. If the hedonic content of Y is zero, then Equation 1a holds. But if money is a 
potent basis for assessing or comparing social status, then the hedonic content of Y is not trivial. 
Ignoring this aspect implies an incomplete valuation of Z. 
 
Consider next Z in the same function. Goods that are generally intended for exchange do not 
carry any hedonic content regardless when or where trade occurs. Dispassionate or routine 
transaction rids Z of hedonic content. If so, Equation 1a also holds. In contrast, goods for use or 
enjoyment take on hedonic content. Attachment, sentiment, motivation, attention, etc. make “use 
value” more salient thereby producing loss aversion and reluctance to trade. In fact, the price of a 
good is not anymore a relevant consideration when “use value” governs both thinking and feeling. 
Ignoring this aspect implies an incomplete valuation of Z. 
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In view of the above discussions, the internalization of the hedonic contents of Y and Z leads the 
utility function to take the form U = H[Y, Z, E(Y, Z)], where E is the “emotion” function. The 
other expressions and assumptions are as defined. For now, assume that the setting of Z is not 
relevant to the valuation procedure. As such,  
dY
dZ
Z
E
H
Y
E
HH
dZ
dY
Y
E
H
Z
E
HH
YU
ZU
EEY
EEZ
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
    (4) 
where )(
dZ
dY
Y
E
H
Z
E
H EE
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ represents the hedonic content of Y and Z to be included in the valuation 
and )(
dY
dZ
Z
E
H
Y
E
H EE
∂
∂
+
∂
∂  is the extension to the numeraire good. Logic dictates that EH > 0, Z
E
∂
∂ > 0, 
and 
Y
E
∂
∂ > 0 if the hedonic contents are not trivial. These results indicate some important elements 
in the psychology of valuation.5 
 
The third item to consider is that the setting is not trivial. That is, the setting in which Z is 
received under an ex ante condition of no possession and that in which Z is given up under an ex 
ante condition of possession matters. Suppose for now Y and Z do not carry hedonic content. The 
internalization of the setting requires the utility function to take the form U = H[(Y, Z, Q(Z)], 
where Q is the “setting” function. The valuation of Z, in this case, is: 
Y
ZZ
H
dZ
Qd
HH
YU
ZU +
=
∂∂
∂∂
      (5a) 
where
dZ
dQ
HZ is the setting to be included in the valuation. If the setting is relevant or perceived to 
be such, then
dZ
dQ
HZ > 0; otherwise, dZ
dQ
HZ = 0. Equation 5a is actually what the extant valuation 
                                                 
5 An important issue here is whether the fickleness, even fleeting, nature of emotions bring instability in the 
valuation procedure. If so, the results are deemed spurious. It is not straightforward to what extent Equation 
2 is resolved with Equation 4 since there are no indirect income effects. 
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procedures on endowment attempt to measure but notice that it continues to be an incomplete 
valuation of Z because the income effects remain incomplete since the exchange of money is not 
trivial in the context where the endowment is not trivial.  
 
Accordingly, allowing for the income effects means that the utility function take the form U = 
H[Y, Z(Y), Q(Z)]. Now, the valuation Z is: 
dY
dZ
FF
dZ
dQ
HF
YU
ZU
ZY
ZZ
+
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
      (5b) 
Notice that Equation 5b reverts to Equation 1 if both income effects and the setting do not matter 
at all.6 More importantly, the interpretation of Equation 5a and 5b is essentially the same as with 
Equations 3a earlier even with the addition of 
dZ
dQ
HZ in the expression. The results indicate that 
the setting is another important element in the psychology of valuation. 
 
3. The Alternative: Subjective Well-Being Approach to Valuation 
 
The subjective well-being (SWB) procedure, as an alternative to the ones presented in the earlier 
sections, asserts three things. First, choice-action does not reflect true utility. So going back to 
classical utility is the right direction to pursue because analysis is then anchored on personal 
                                                 
6 Putting the economics and psychology of valuation together obtains a utility function of the form U = 
H[(Y(Z), Z(Y), E(Y, Z), Q(Z)], where Y and Z are assumed endogenous to each other and the three elements 
of hedonic content are assumed not trivial. Thus,
dY
dZ
Z
E
H
Y
E
H
dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dY
Y
E
H
Z
E
H
dZ
dQ
H
dZ
dY
HH
YU
ZU
EEZY
EEZYZ
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+++
=
∂∂
∂∂ is the 
valuation of Z. As with footnote 7, )(
dZ
dY
Y
E
H
Z
E
H EE
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ and )(
dY
dZ
Z
E
H
Y
E
H EE
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ might introduce instability 
and volatility to the valuation procedure. 
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experience. Yet, the shift does not really bring a fundamental change in the manner by which 
utility analysis per se is conducted, except that doing so allows for a second assertion, namely: a 
market or pseudo-market setting is not a helpful framework in the context of valuation. The 
discomfort with choice-action and the market is really about what meaning to put on the valuation 
of a good when a person is not capable, even powerless, in changing the situation given corporate 
power, political expediency, and class interest. Put simply, choice-action and the market are not 
necessary in order to perform the valuation of a good if the numeraire good is well defined and it 
is accepted as such. The third assertion is the following: the hedonic contents of income, the good, 
and the setting might be the ones being valued and not the good itself. The proposal is to decouple 
emotions from the procedure but retain the elements for a complete valuation procedure. 
Nevertheless, the setting may be a valuable aspect to consider given that the nature of endowment 
can have an effect on the valuation of a good. 
 
Since true utility is an internal state of being, the SWB procedure begins with a claim that the 
self-reported state of being exhibits a positive monotonic transformation of the underlying true 
utility. That is, SWBi ≡ h[Ui( · )], where SWB is the self-reported state of being, SWB2 > SWB1 if 
U2( ·
 ) > U1( ·
 ), and state i+1 is deemed superior to state i for i = 1,…, n. Note that SWB does not 
involve its hedonic component given that the hedonic contents of Z and Y are discarded in this 
context.7 The contention is that a person is able to distinguish the alternative states of being 
                                                 
7 Studies find that SWB is comprised of the separable and independently measurable components of affect 
and satisfaction (Lucas et al. 1996; Diener and Emmons 1985). “Affect” is the hedonic component of the 
state of being and it is separable into positive and negative feelings (Watson et al. 1988). “Judgment” is the 
self-assessment of life in general. Judgment is generally more stable than affect. 
   Studies find that measures of SWB are reliable, robust, and valid. Reliability tests using self-assessments 
obtained from one person but at different points in the same interview (Ehrhardt et al. 2000) or from the 
same person but at different periods (Krueger and Schkade 2008) give consistent and stable results. People 
who say they are happy at time t are generally also happy in time t+1, excluding any extraordinary or 
dramatic life events between the two periods. Validity tests find strong evidence that measures of SWB 
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regardless of what metric is used for the self-assessment. The implication then is as follows: a 
“better” situation that is judged superior to that of a “good” situation is viewed as such; similarly, a 
“good” situation that is judged superior to that of a “bad” situation is viewed as such, etc.8  
 
Therefore, the SWB function takes the familiar set up of SWB = H(Y, Z). The expressions and 
assumptions are as defined. In this case, however, Z is deemed as an “external” variable that is 
inserted in the SWB function for the purpose of the valuation (c.f., footnote 5), albeit Z 
contributes in some way or another to the state of being. This setup is saying that joint evaluations 
are precluded so the valuation procedure is focused on Z alone. In discarding the hedonic contents 
of Y and Z, issues like familiarity or understanding of the good, the money used in and the nature 
of the transaction, etc., become immaterial. In effect, the assessment of feelings or emotions does 
not affect the valuation of the good.  
 
As such, the valuation of Z is
Y
Z
H
H
Y
SWB
Z
SWB
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
(c.f., Equation 1a). The following expressions are 
obtained if income effects and then substitution effect, respectively, are introduced:  
dY
dZ
HH
H
YSWB
ZSWB
ZY
Z
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
     (6a) 
and 
                                                                                                                                                 
capture what they are suppose to measure. Studies find people with high subjective well-being smile more 
(Ekman et al. 1990; Pavot et al. 1991) and they are rated with high subjective well-being by their spouses, 
relatives, or peers (Costa and McRae 1988; Sandvik et al. 1993). Even studies in neuroscience find a tight 
correspondence between subjective well-being and the location of brain activity associated with well-being 
(Davidson 2003; Urry et al. 2004).   
8 According to Frey and Stutzer (2010), cardinality is not required in order to perform the SWB approach to 
valuation. Studies especially those in psychology assume that self-reports are (interpersonally comparable) 
cardinal values, while most of the applications in economics assume that self-reports are (interpersonally 
comparable) ordinal values.  
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dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dY
HH
YSWB
ZSWB
ZY
YZ
+
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
     (6b) 
The equations are called “exclusive” SWB procedures (c.f., Equations 3a and 3b). There is no 
doubt that the above equations are facsimiles to those in Section 2.1, thus validating the assertion 
that there is no fundamental change in the way the valuation of the good is carried out. However, 
the point here is that the alternative procedure is a better setup because it bypasses the issues that 
burden the extant procedures.  
 
The setting can be accommodated in the valuation procedure in the same manner as Z is 
introduced as an external variable in the SWB function (c.f., footnote 5). In doing so, the setting 
is introduced but the assessment of feelings or emotions that are associated with the setting are 
precluded. The SWB function thus takes the form SWB = H[[Y, Z(Y)] + Q(Z)] or SWB = H[[Y(Z), 
Z(Y)] + Q(Z)] depending on the assumptions on Y and Z. Respectively, the valuations of Z are: 
dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dQ
HH
YSWB
ZSWB
ZY
ZZ
+
+
=
∂∂
∂∂
     (7a) 
or 
dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dQ
H
dZ
dY
HH
YSWB
ZSWB
ZY
ZYZ
+
++
=
∂∂
∂∂
    (7b) 
These expressions are called “inclusive” SWB procedures. Moreover, these expressions are able 
to resolve Equation 2. The analyses of Equations 6a and 6b as well as 7a and 7b are the same as 
those of Equations 3a and 3b as well as 5a and 5b.9  The central issues of direct and indirect 
                                                 
9 Suppose HY > 0 and
dZ
dQ
HZ > 0. The receipt of money means )0( >WTAYH ↓ and )( dY
dZ
HZ > 0↑, whereas 
the payment of money means )0( >
WTPYH ↑ and )( dY
dZ
HZ < 0↓. Let dY
dZ > 0. The indirect income effect 
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income effects and setting are fully accounted with Equation 7a, whereas the substitution effect is 
accounted with Equation 7b. Putting the important elements of the economics and psychology of 
valuation together, Equations 7a and 7b therefore present a valuation procedure that is not only 
dispassionate but also complete. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The paper argued that incomplete valuation is the cause of the WTA-WTP gap, and so complete 
valuation is the solution to the problem. The first solution concerns the inclusion of the income 
and substitution effects. The second solution concerns the inclusion of the hedonic content of 
income, the good, and the setting. Pursuing the first solution alone fulfills the expectations for the 
efficient allocation of goods but does not fulfill psychological expectations, especially when 
moral satisfaction like existence or intrinsic value, emotion, and other factors like attitude and 
personality are relevant. Pursuing the second solution alone fulfills the psychological expectations 
but does not fulfill efficiency requirements, especially if scarcity is relevant. Moreover, the focus 
on the hedonic content might result in emotion as the one being valued and not the good per se. 
Finally, the paper presented the subjective well-being approach to valuation as an alternative to 
the extant procedures. The third solution decouples choice-action, market, and hedonic values 
from the valuation procedure even as it takes into account income and substitution effects as well 
as the relevance of the setting in the valuation of the good. It thus presents an approach that is not 
only dispassionate but also productive in advancing the economics and psychology of valuation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
depends on HZ (again, Equations 3a and 3b). By logical necessity,
dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dQ
HH
dY
dZ
HH
dZ
dQ
HH
ZY
ZZ
ZY
ZZ
WTPWTA
+
+
=
+
+
resolves 
Equation 2. The outcome is the same if
dY
dZ < 0. 
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